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Introduction16
17
There has been growing interest in a range of disciplines18
(Ackroyd and Fleetwood 2000; Danermark et al. 2002;19
Fleetwood 1999; Fleetwood and Ackroyd 2004), not least20
information systems (Dobson 2001; Longshore Smith 2006;21
Mingers 2004b; Mutch 2010b; Volkoff et al. 2007; Wynn and22
Williams 2012) in ideas derived from the philosophical tradi-23
tion of critical realism.  Critical realism offers exciting pros-24
pects in shifting attention toward the real problems that we25
face and their underlying causes, and away from a focus on26
data and methods of analysis.  As such, it offers a robust27
framework for the use of a variety of methods in order to gain28
a better understanding of meaning and significance of29
information systems in the contemporary world.30
31
Although the term critical realism has been used in a number32
of different traditions, we are primarily concerned with that33
developed from the foundational work of Roy Bhaskar in the34
philosophy of science, later extended in the social arena by35
authors such as Archer and Sayer (Archer et al. 1998; Bhaskar36
1978, 1979; Mingers 2004b; Sayer 2000).  In this tradition,37
the benefits of CR are seen as:38
39
• CR defends a strongly realist ontology that there is an40
existing, causally efficacious, world independent of our41
knowledge.  It defends this against both classical positi-42
vism that would reduce the world to that which can be
empirically observed and measured, and the various
forms of constructivism that would reduce the world to
our human knowledge of it.  Hence it is realist.
• CR recognizes that our access to this world is in fact
limited and always mediated by our perceptual and theo-
retical lenses.  It accepts epistemic relativity (that knowl-
edge is always local and historical), but not judgemental
relativity (that all viewpoints must be equally valid). 
Hence it is critical in a Kantian sense.
• CR accepts the existence of different types of objects of
knowledge—physical, social, and conceptual—which
have different ontological and epistemological charac-
teristics.  They therefore require a range of different
research methods and methodologies to access them.
Since a particular object of research may well have
different characteristics, it is likely that a mixed-method
research strategy (i.e., a variety of methods in the same
research study) will be necessary and CR supports this.
In this introduction, we will first introduce the basic concepts
of critical realism as a philosophy of science, and then discuss
its extensions into the social realm, before finally introducing
the excellent papers that are included in this issue.
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Critical Realism:  Basic Concepts1
2
Critical realism (CR) developed initially by way of arguments3
against both the empiricist view of science as embodied in4
positivism (Bhaskar 1978), and the idealist view of (social)5
science as embodied in constructivism or interpretivism6
(Bhaskar 1979).  Later, it also engaged with postmodernism7
and other irrealist viewpoints (Bhaskar 1986, 1989).  Through8
this immanent critique of alternative positions it developed its9
own approach, which was most fully articulated within a10
dialectical perspective (Bhaskar 1993).11
12
The starting point was to argue, specifically against empiri-13
cism and positivism, that science is not just about recording14
constant conjunctions of observable events, as the Humean15
view of causation embedded in positivism would have it, but16
is about objects, entities and structures that exist (even though17
perhaps unobservable) and generate the events the we18
observe.  The form of the argument is a transcendental one.19
That is, it begins with some accepted phenomenon and asks20
what the world must be like for this to occur.  In this case,21
what is accepted by both empiricism and many forms of22
idealism is that we do have perceptual experience of the23
world, and that science is carried out through experimental24
activity in which scientists bring about particular outcomes.25
The argument is that neither empiricism nor idealism can26
successfully explain these occurrences and that they necessi-27
tate some form of realist ontology.  Essentially, there must be28
some intransitive domain of object and events, independent of29
our perceptions of them, which can indeed become objects of30
our knowledge.31
32
The argument can be expressed in terms of the mistake that33
both empiricism and strong forms of idealism or construc-34
tivism make—that is, the epistemic fallacy.  The essential35
mistake is in reducing the ontological domain of existence to36
the epistemological domain of knowledge:  statements about37
being are translated into ones about our (human) knowledge38
or experience of being.  For the empiricist, that which cannot39
be perceived cannot be.  For the conventionalist, limitations40
of our knowledge of being are taken to be limitations on being41
itself.  In contrast, the realist asserts the primacy of ontology:42
the world would exist whether or not humans did.  The empi-43
ricist identification of causal laws with empirical regularities44
thus involves a double reduction—that of laws to events and45
events to experiences of those events.46
47
But what is it that causes or generates events given both the48
regularities that can be established in experiments, and the49
common absence of regularity outside?  Equally, how can we50
assure ourselves that event regularities are based on necessary51
connections rather than simply coincidence?  The answer is52
that there must be enduring entities, physical (e.g., atoms or
organisms), social (e.g., the market or the family) or concep-
tual  (e.g., categories or ideas), observable or not, that have
powers or tendencies to act in particular ways.  It is the con-
tinual operation and interaction of these mechanisms that
generates the flux of events.  Entities or mechanisms may
have powers without exercising them at a particular time (it
may need an experiment or particular context to trigger them),
and powers may be exercised but not become manifest in
events because of the countervailing operation of some other
generative mechanism.  The heart of this argument is that of
a causal criterion for existence rather than a perceptual one. 
In other words, for an empiricist, only that which can be
perceived can exist, whereas for a realist, having a causal
effect on the world implies existence, regardless of percept-
ability. This view of causal mechanisms is at the heart of
critical realism and, independently, is also becoming
dominant within mainstream philosophy of science (Illari and
Williamson 2011).
For Bhaskar, reality is both intransitive (existing indepen-
dently of humans) and stratified (Archer 1998, p. 41).  The
first form of stratification is between mechanisms, the events
that they generate, and the subset of events that are actually
experienced.  These are known as the domains of the real, the
actual, and the empirical.  The real contains mechanisms,
events, and experiences (i.e., the whole of reality); the actual
consists of events that do (or perhaps do not) occur and
includes the empirical, those events that are observed or
experienced.  These distinctions arise from the transcendental
arguments above, namely, that we should not reduce all
events to only those that are observed, and we should not
reduce enduring causal mechanisms to events.
A second form of stratification is within the realm of objects
themselves (Archer 1998, p. 66), where causal powers at one
level (e.g., chemical reactions) can be seen as generated by
those of a lower level (atomic valency).  One strata is emer-
gent from another (what Bhaskar terms “emergent powers
materialism”).  The picture of the real is thus one of a com-
plex interaction between dynamic, open, stratified systems,
both material and non-material, where particular structures
give rise to certain causal powers, tendencies, or ways of
acting, often called by Bhaskar (1979, p. 170) “generative
mechanisms.”  The interaction of these generative mech-
anisms, where one often counterbalances another, generates
the presence or absence of actual events.
Having established the intransitive objects of knowledge, we
must recognize that the production of knowledge is very much
the work of humans, and occurs in what we could call the
transitive dimension (Bhaskar 1989, p. 18).  Acknowledging
2 MIS Quarterly Vol. 37 No. X/Forthcoming 2013
Mingers et al./Introduction:  Critical Realism in Information Systems Research
the work of sociologists, the practice of science is a social1
process drawing on existing theories, results, anomalies, and2
conjectures (the transitive objects of knowledge) to generate3
improved knowledge of science’s intransitive objects.  This4
distinction allows us to admit the epistemic relativity of5
science, the fact that knowledge is always historically and6
socially located, without losing the ontological dimension.7
We should also note that such epistemic relativity does not8
imply a corresponding judgmental relativity (i.e., that all9
views are equally valid and that there are no rational grounds10
for choosing between them).11
12
We can now describe the critical realist scientific method-13
ology, what Bhaskar calls retroduction (this is essentially the14
same as “abduction,” as developed by C. S. Peirce  (1931–15
1958, ss. 5.145) in contrast to induction and deduction).  We16
take some unexplained phenomenon that is of interest to us17
and propose hypothetical mechanisms that, if they existed,18
would generate or cause that which is to be explained.  So, we19
move from experiences in the empirical domain to possible20
structures or mechanisms in the real domain.  This is the21
essential methodological step in CR studies:  to move from22
descriptions of empirical events or regularities to potential23
causal mechanisms, of a variety of kinds, some of which may24
be nonphysical and nonobservable, the interaction of which25
could potentially have generated the events.  Such hypotheses26
do not, of course, prove that the mechanisms do in fact exist.27
And, we may have competing explanations proposed, so there28
is then a further stage within the methodology in which more29
research has to be carried out to try and eliminate some of the30
explanations and perhaps support others.31
32
One could ask:  How do we know that such hypothetical33
mechanisms actually do exist rather than being merely34
interesting ideas?  At one level, the answer is that we can35
never know for certain, since CR accepts that knowledge is36
always fallible.  More practically, however, the intransitivity37
of real structures means that they will always have the poten-38
tial for effects that go beyond us (i.e., are out of our control),39
and the approach means that we should aim to eliminate40
alternative explanations by testing in some way for their41
potential effects.  This methodology is known as DREI:42
describe the events of interest; retroduce explanatory mech-43
anisms; eliminate false hypotheses; identify the correct44
mechanisms.  In terms of research methods, CR is eclectic.45
Because the underlying structures may have a variety of46
forms—material, social, and cognitive—we need a variety of47
epistemological methods to access them.  Traditionally, CR48
has been somewhat hostile to statistical methods, especially49
in social science, on the grounds that they assume a degree of50
closure that is seldom present (Olsen and Morgan 2005) but51
there is now a greater acceptance of their value (Mingers52
2006; Pratschke 2003).  CR also licenses and underpins the
idea of combining different research methods, what is called
mixed-method research or multimethodology (Mingers 2001;
Venkatesh et al. 2013).  Wynn and Williams (2012) have
produced a valuable description of principles for critical
realist case study research.
We have so far discussed the ontological commitments of CR,
and we now move to a more epistemological argument:  that
social science is essentially similar to natural science in its
realist character, albeit with modifications to reflect the par-
ticular nature of the social world.  We can begin by asking
what would rule out a realist approach to social science.  The
answer is presumably that there are no intransitive objects for
social science to investigate.  Such an argument could come
from the extreme constructivists (or superidealists, as Bhaskar
calls them) who would also apply it to the natural world, or
from those such as constructivists or individualists who would
argue for the distinctive nature of social phenomena as being
intrinsically meaningful and not existing independently of the
mental processes of social actors.
Bhaskar’s (1979, Ch. 2) primary argument is against method-
ological individualists who maintain that all explanations can
be couched in terms of an individual’s beliefs and actions.
The first refutation concerns emergent properties:  there are
attributes that can be applied to people that concern physical
features, height, weight; there are attributes that we share with
other animals such as pain or hunger; but there are many
attributes, essentially human ones, that are unavoidably social,
for example bachelor, banker, or nun.  These are only intel-
ligible within the context of a social institution or practice.
The second argument is that many activities we undertake,
most obviously, perhaps, language, must already exist and be
available for people to learn and then use.  As Wittgenstein
(1958) argued, there can be no such thing as a private lan-
guage; every time anyone has a conversation, uses a credit
card, or waits for a train, they are assuming the existence of
a structured, intransitive domain of resources, concepts, prac-
tices, and relationships.  The successful occurrence of social
activities warrants the existence of causally efficacious,
although unobservable, social structures.  
Bhaskar does accept, however, that social phenomena are
inherently different from material phenomena and that this
does put limits on the nature of social science (see Bhaskar
1979).  Social science is, however, still driven by the exis-
tence of an intransitive domain of generative mechanisms; a
recognition of the epistemic (but not judgmental) relativity of
knowledge; and a retroductive methodology that explains
events by hypothesizing causal mechanisms.
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Social Theory Within Critical Realism1
2
Building on these conceptual foundations, a number of ap-3
proaches to the social world have been developed.  Prominent4
among them, and figuring in contributions to this special5
issue, are the work of Margaret Archer (1995) in sociology6
and Tony Lawson (1997) in economics.  It is important to7
note that both started from a critical engagement with existing8
perspectives in their respective domains, an engagement9
which saw them turn to critical realism in its role as an10
“under-laborer” to help them develop their own approaches.11
This is important because it emphasizes that critical realism12
both requires and facilitates detailed engagement with other13
traditions, as illustrated by the connections that Allen et al.14
(2013) draw with activity theory in their contribution.  It also15
points to on-going debate between those that share the basic16
ontological commitments outlined in the previous section. 17
Bhaskar (1979) himself developed an application of his ideas18
to the social world which he termed the transformational19
model of social action (TMSA).  It is worth noting that20
aspects of this inform Giddens’ (1984) arguments in devel-21
oping his widely influential structuration theory (Mingers22
2004a).  The TMSA has been broadly endorsed by Lawson23
and others, such as Faulkner and Runde (2013) who use it as24
a backdrop to their conceptual explorations of materiality in25
this issue.  By contrast, Archer has been more critical and has26
developed her approach over an extensive series of books27
(Archer 1988, 1995, 2000, 2003, 2007, 2012).  As it is devel-28
oped at such length and is employed by a number of contrib-29
utors to this special issue, Archer’s approach is worth briefly30
exploring a little further.31
32
Archer’s work is closely associated with her contribution to33
the structure–agency debate.  The particular relevance to the34
IS domain is that she develops her ideas through an extensive35
critique of the work of Giddens, whose structuration theory36
has been widely used as a guiding theory, notably in the work37
of Orlikowski (2000).  Archer suggest that Giddens’ formula-38
tion of structures as “memory traces” conflates agency and39
structure and does not allow for a consideration of their devel-40
opment and relationship over time.  We can trace the con-41
tinuing influence of this tendency in the ideas of socio-42
materiality, where the social and the material are seen as43
constitutively entangled (Orlikowski and Scott 2008).  By44
contrast, Archer’s ideas, with their notion of “analytical45
dualism,” enable us to refresh traditions such as socio-46
technical systems that examine the interplay between the47
social and the material over time (Leonardi and Barley 2008).48
Archer’s work, however, is about more than the formulation49
of agency as taking place always in conditions which predate50
action and which shape the opportunities available.  Her more51
recent work has focused on the nature of reflexivity.  Using
the notion of the “internal conversation,” by which humans
monitor the on-going status of their central concerns, she
argues that all humans are reflexive, but that they deploy
different modes of reflexivity.  Such modes, she argues, are
linked to particular combinations of structural and cultural
moments, both in time and space.  Dobson et al. (2013) use
these ideas productively to look at the fate of ICT develop-
ments in rural Australia.  There is much to be done to develop
these ideas, development which will happen as the ideas are
put into practice, but Archer’s work provides a rich seam of
concepts which could help us better understand questions of
IS use.
Such use is not without its challenges.  A key injunction from
Archer is that we need to develop “analytical narratives” in
which the interplay of agency, structure and culture is ex-
amined over time.  Njihia and Merali (2013) essay such a
narrative in their account of ICT4D in Kenya, but this is a
difficult task within the confines of a journal article.  Archer’s
(1979) own early empirical work on the development of
educational systems covers a 300 year period in some 800
pages!  That points to another challenge, in that her ideas are
developed on the terrain of social theory, covering often large
sweeps of time.  Relating this to the examination of contem-
porary organizations and their use of IS can seem daunting.
Archer has relatively little to say about either, but theorists
such as Elder-Vass (2008) in the same tradition and those
working in organization theory are starting to translate the
ideas to a more usable scale (Ackroyd and Fleetwood 2000).
By the same token, the work of both Lawson and Archer pro-
ceeds by way of the critique of existing positions and the
development of responses at the level of general and abstract
theory.  This often seems distant from the concerns of those
examining more situated action and a key challenge is
showing how these ideas can be applied to aid concrete
research.  This special issue is one step in progressing this
agenda, and we reflect on some of the methodological
challenges that this posed in the next section.  However,
before doing this, it is worth outlining briefly some oppor-
tunities for taking some of the ideas thrown out by Archer
forward.
In arguing for the centrality of The Reflexive Imperative in
Late Modernity, Archer suggests that 
From the 1980s onwards, the synergy between
multi-national production and information tech-
nology resulted in unprecedented morphogenesis,
whose generative mechanism is for variety to spawn
more variety (2012, p. 64).
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This is surely a set of claims which are the central terrain of1
scholars in our field.  One way in which we can contribute to2
this debate is by testing the strength of such claims, which rest3
on a limited engagement with the detail of organizational4
research.  One of the interesting tensions is that Archer’s5
argument for the centrality of reflexivity in contemporary6
conditions tends to downplay both routine action and tacit7
forms of knowing, whereas a considerable volume of work on8
organizations and IS stresses the centrality of both (Mutch9
2010a).  Archer’s claims might cause us to reassess these10
positions.  It also might suggest the need for more focus on11
how the systems we study have changed the ways in which12
actors within organizations use information.  This is chal-13
lenging, because it falls at the intersection of a number of14
disciplinary domains.  It also suggests that more of our work15
ought to be on the use of systems over time, as opposed to16
looking at how systems are implemented.  Although we17
recognize the problems associated with enterprise systems, it18
remains the case that they, however imperfectly, are central to19
the activities of multinational organizations and, one assumes,20
to the way in which those who work in them use the infor-21
mation they supply to carry out their work.  Whether such22
systems shift the mode of reflexivity that s deploy, perhaps by23
demanding a more systemic and abstract form of reasoning,24
and whether such shifts are widespread, are important ques-25
tions that could, in turn feed into these broader debates at the26
level of social theory.27
Themes in the Special Issue:  Theory28
Building, Research Methods, 29
Applications30
31
This special issue attracted a range of contributions working32
within and across the boundaries of critical realist thinking33
and methods.  While most papers had elements of all three34
contributions—theory building, methods, and applications of35
CR—authors did tend to prioritize in which area they were36
going to make their primary intellectual and research effort.37
Theory Building38
39
Two  papers—those by Faulkner and Runde and by Volkoff40
and Strong—focus primarily on theory development, while a41
third—that by Allen, Brown, Karanasios, and Norman—42
compares and relates critical realist concepts with activity43
theory and provides demonstrations of  theories in action.44
45
In “Technological Objects, Social Position, and the Trans-46
formational Model of Social Activity,” Faulkner and Runde47
identify a gap in IS-related applications of critical realism. 
The lack of a systematic theory of the nature, position and
identity of technological objects within the TMSA leads them
to lay tracks down here, with particular attention to a category
particularly key for modern information systems:  nonmaterial
technological objects.  Accepting the TMSA as a “highly
generalized but…descriptively accurate image of how society
is organized, reproduced, and transformed” (p. 1), their
important contribution here is to elaborate a theory of the
nature and identity of technological objects and integrate this
theory within the TMSA.  The theory itself applies to material
as well as nonmaterial technical objects.  Briefly stated, they
suggest that  an object possesses a particular technical identity
within a community if (1) it has assigned to it the function
associated with that technical identity and (2) its structure is
such that it is generally able to perform that function.  The
paper then, valuably, imports the theory into the TMSA.  How
this is done is a key contribution of the paper.
In “Critical Realism and Affordances:  Theorizing IT-
Associated Organizational Change Processes,” Volkoff and
Strong provide theory development in developing and opera-
tionalizing critical realism’s concept of generative mechanism
for an IS context.  Using Gibson’s affordance theory from
evolutionary psychology, Volkoff and Strong show how
affordances are a specific form of generative mechanism and
that “affordances are the generative mechanisms we need to
specify” (p. 1).  For these authors, affordance refers to what
is offered, provided, or furnished to someone or something by
an object.  An affordance exists at what critical realists refer
to as the domain of the real.  Their contribution here is to
provide a consistent use of the concept and a clear ontology.
Their subsequent contribution is to provide to CR and gener-
ative mechanisms the opportunity for more fine-grained
explanations of causality, through the development of middle
range theory using the concept of affordance.  This theory
contribution is illustrated by reanalyzing two published cases
involving an enterprise system and a custom-built software
system.  Volkoff and Strong provide a critical realist lens to
the cases, identifying across them 19 affordances, and devel-
oping the image of affordances as “a thick bundle of inter-
acting strands” (p. 12).  It is a highly useful demonstration of
how generative mechanisms, informed by affordance theory,
can be operationalized in IS research, and also rescues the
critical realist underpinnings of the original concept of
affordance.
Allen, Brown, Karanasios, and Norman also make a contri-
bution to theory.  Their paper is titled “How Should
Technology-Mediated Organizational Change Be Explained? 
A Comparsion of the Contributions of Critical Realism and
Activity Theory.”  They argue that critical realism and
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activity theory can complement one another in forging a1
“philosophically coherent yet practically attuned materialist2
framework for understanding  IS and the way it supports and3
transforms work activity” (p. 2).  One strong argument the4
authors make is that activity theory addresses some weakness5
in CR they identify, particularly in Archer’s (1995) morpho-6
genetic approach.  They focus specifically on inscription and7
social and cultural relations in technology.  Activity theory as8
espoused by Ilyenkov (1977) is shown to foreground as9
essential certain aspects neglected until recently within10
critical realism, namely semiotics and the mediation of  sub-11
ject and object by technology.  The paper also offers two12
cases of technology-mediated organizational change con-13
cerning paramedic treatment of heart attack patients and14
ambulance dispatch activity.  The authors provide a detailed15
account of the processes of change through tensions and16
contradictions in activity systems, and also introduce the17
concept of congruencies involving temporary stabilization.18
By building further on CR-related insights on the inscription19
of social and cultural relations within technology, they show20
how the organizational performance management agenda is21
mediated through IS operationalization in ways that affect the22
power structure, as well as the efficiency of the organization.23
Methods and Applications24
25
In “Methodological Implications of Critical Realism for26
Mixed-Methods Research,” Zachariadis, Scott, and Barrett27
examine key CR ideas on causation, validity, and generali-28
zability, and illustrate how these shape the logic of inference29
in the research process through retroduction.  They make a30
major contribution in using mixed-methods research within a31
critical realist framework.  As they point out, the methodo-32
logical implications of CR for mixed methods research have33
been largely unexplored.  They usefully explore what happens34
when working within CR’s stratified ontology and focusing35
on underlying mechanisms, and demonstrate that this36
refocusing leads to a different (from conventional) under-37
standing of concepts of reliability, validity, and inference38
quality.  In designing mixed-methods research, they point out39
that the role of quantitative methods within CR is largely40
descriptive since generalizations and correlations between41
variables alone cannot uncover evidence regarding causal42
mechanisms that generate actual events observed, or predict43
future incidents.  Qualitative methods within CR have a more44
profound role, as they are more capable of describing a45
phenomenon, constructing propositions, and identifying46
structured interactions between complex mechanisms.  At the47
same time, for these authors, CR does not commit to a single48
type of research.  CR’s critical methodological pluralism is49
grounded on its ontological and epistemological assumptions,50
thus preserving a strong link between meta-theory and
method.  As well as this important theoretical contribution to
developing critical realist-informed methods, the authors also
contribute a strong demonstration of the applicability of their
thinking in a case study of the effect of SWIFT adoption on
bank performance.  This illustrates how the logic of retro-
duction can guide a dynamic interplay between methods
involving constant comparison.  The mixed methods approach
enabled moves between situated narrative and statistical
descriptions of populations in order to uncover generative
mechanisms and make robust meta-inferences.
Three other papers are relatively more straightforward,
although imaginative and insightful applications of morpho-
genentic analysis and CR-informed methods, particularly
leveraging the concept of generative mechanisms.  In “The
Broader Context for ICT4D Projects:  A Morphogenetic
Analysis,” Njihia and Merali demonstrate the power of
Archer’s morphogenetic approach (MA) for developing
insights  about the process and relational dynamics of ICT
projects in complex contexts—in this case, the Kenyan public
sector across a 40-plus year time line.  As the authors point
out, Archer conceived MA as the practical complement of CR
philosophy, supplying an explanatory methodology grounded
in an adequate social ontology and of practical use for ana-
lysts.  A great strength of the paper is that MA is used in an
in-depth study to  reveal over a long time line the processes
and mechanisms that explain how the ICT for development
trajectory emerged from the interplay of interactions at dif-
ferent levels of players in global, national, public, private,
third sector,  and civil society institutions and organizations. 
Njihia and Merali found that MA made it incumbent on them
to look for deep systemic generative causal mechanisms and
to account for the import and impact of the broader context.
Archer’s analytic apparatus enabled separation of the parts
from the whole, the analysis of time and temporality in pro-
cesses of transformation, and the role of network structures
and dynamics in explaining ICT-related change.  The authors
also see the adoption of CR methodology and its emancipa-
tory ethos as potentially changing how ICT4D studies are
conducted, including under what assumptions they are
pursued.
In “The Generative Mechanisms of Digital Infrastructure
Evolution,” Henfridsson and Bygstadt contribute a major
study of the important and neglected area of digital infra-
structure in contemporary organizations.  Their paper deals
with the research question:  Which mechanism contingently
causes digital infrastructure evolution?  The researchers
choose critical realism as an intellectual structure for its
emphasis on generative mechanisms, because there has been
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all too little research on digital infrastructure geared toward1
developing  a comprehensive understanding of the range of2
contingencies of causal structures in its evolution.  Henfrids-3
son and Bygstad also develop a configurational perspective by4
using a multimethod research design This involved a four-5
year in-depth case study of a new entrant  airline in order to6
identify mechanisms with the power to cause digital structure7
evolution.  The paper uncovers two conditions that provided8
a powerful environment for digital infrastructure evolution: 9
an enabling, service-oriented architecture and an open,10
entrepreneurial culture.  But while these conditions triggered11
the evolution, the analysis uncovered three mechanisms12
behind the successful evolution observed at the airline:  the13
innovation mechanism, adoption mechanism, and scaling14
mechanism (AIS).  The study is notable not least for its next15
step methodologically:  a systematic collection and coding of16
41 case studies from the research literature on digital17
infrastructure, with the coding scheme focusing on three18
elements of configuration, namely context, mechanisms, and19
outcome.  They find multiple causal paths of digital infra-20
structure evolution, but, valuably, work through in detail the21
contingent arrangements that produce successful and22
unsuccessful outcomes.23
24
Williams and Karahanna also tackle a big subject armed with25
critical realist concepts and methods.  Their paper is titled26
“Causal Explanation in the Coordinating Process:  A Critical27
Realist Case Study of Federated IT Governance Structures.” 28
Here, the researchers focus on a perennial issue in IS, that of29
effective IT governance structures.  However, the study is30
unusual in tackling the very neglected, although critical, issue31
of coordination and how it is achieved.  An immediate contri-32
bution is the discussion of coordination mechanisms and their33
role.  A key product here is a conceptualization of the co-34
ordinating process based on a critical realist perspective.  The35
researchers then  carry out a comparative longitudinal case36
study of two coordinating efforts in a federated ITG structure. 37
Their objective was to conduct a critical realist search for38
causal mechanisms.  Using a logic employing deductive,39
inductive, and retroductive elements, they identify two causal40
mechanisms—consensus making and unit aligning—that help41
to explain the coordinating process and outcomes observed in42
the two efforts.  Because the case research is so rich, the43
authors are able also to develop a multilevel understanding of44
unit level and consensus-making coordinating as macro–45
micro, micro–macro, and micro–micro level mechanisms.46
The paper also discusses complementarity with rational47
choice and power/politics theories as explanations.48
49
The final paper selected for this special issue that we will50
discuss provides a highly interesting, CR-informed case51
application at the country and regional levels.  In “Explaining
Broadband Adoption in Rural Australia:  Modes of Reflex-
ivity and the Morphogenetic Approach,” Dobson, Jackson,
and Gengatharen use critical realism as an “under-laborer” to
help examine the complex reality of rural adoption for com-
munities and small business in the regions.  In this paper, a
study of the development and adoption of the Australian
National Broadband Network takes the foreground.  However,
Danermark et al. (2002) propose a critical realist method
involving six stages in explanatory research and this is used
to guide the methodological development, while Archer’s
morphogenetic model provides the basic social theory for
examining the intimate relationship of broadband and use
with rural social dynamics.  The paper is notable for using
Archer’s more recent work on reflexivity to structure and
inform the analysis.  The paper demonstrates well how Daner-
mark et al. can be applied, in particular the central abstract
processes of analytical resolution, abduction/theoretical
description, retroduction, and comparison with different
theories.  The study is also rare in IS in using Archer’s later
publications to address how an agent’s  internal reflexivity
(“the internal conversation”) interacts with imposing struc-
tural conditions to potentially create change.  Archer suggests
four modes of reflexivity—communicative, autonomous,
meta, and fractured—and the study shows how these can play
out in specific contexts, identifying agency as having an
important role in the mechanism by which agents interact with
relevant cultural and socio-cultural structures in morpho-
genetic or morphostatic sequences as agents adopt broadband
or not.
Conclusion
We are grateful to the team of AEs who not only did a fine
job of finding reviewers but also supplied authors with
detailed and constructive reports.  Much of what makes this
a successful contribution to on-going works is due to their
input, and we thank Michael Cuellar, Philip Dobson, Donald
Hislop, Ivan Horrocks, Duane Truex, Olga Volkoff, Clay
Williams, and Donald Wynn.  It will be noted that some of
these people also submitted articles; we ensured that there
was strict separation between their roles.  We received 30
submissions, which was very pleasing.  This is, of course, an
emerging and developing area of interest, and so it is perhaps
not surprising that some familiar names appear.  By the same
token, however, we welcome some new voices to the conver-
sation and we are encouraged by some new connections that
are made by our contributors.  We hope that our readers also
find value in the work presented here and that it might
encourage them to explore further the rich resources offered
by critical realism.
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